In modern nation-states, it is common to construct a coherent set of shared national traits that allow their members to function as “imagined communities,” or collectives of people who do not have face-to-face contact, yet by referencing these characteristics which they believe to be mutual, perceive themselves as members of the same group (Anderson 1991; Burgess 2010). In Japan, such self-ascribed traits frequently include cultural homogeneity and uniqueness, which imply a cultural distance from and difficulty communicating with the outside world (Befu 2001; Dale 1986; Goodman 2008; McVeigh 2004; Murphy-Shigematsu 2008). U.S. Americans, on the other hand, often view their nation as a product of continuous immigration (Steinberg 1981; Takaki 1993)—resulting in diversity which is a source of pride and strength (Furtado 2012). Their imagined community, by extension, consists of people regularly exposed to individuals from a variety of ethnocultural backgrounds; with that contact, they become reasonably proficient at developing positive intercultural relationships. These are assumptions that Japanese and Americans have not only about themselves, but also, to a certain extent, what they believe about each other. For instance, Japanese are often perceived by Americans and others from Western pluralistic democracies as being less exposed to ethnocultural diversity in the workplace and hence comparatively weaker at building positive intercultural relations as well as behind in accepting non-Japanese coworkers as core organizational members (Asai 2006; Kerr 2001; Kopp 1994; McConnell 2000; Murtagh 2005; Partridge 1987; Russell 1991).
But do these features of imagined communities stand up to scrutiny? Japan is now experiencing a demographic shift as greater numbers of non-Japanese workers are admitted to compensate for a projected labor shortage—one which is predicted in the face of a growing retiree population and a declining birth rate. Non-Japanese number about 2.04 million, or 1.6% of the entire population, which reflects a 50% jump from one decade earlier and nearly twice as many as in 1990 (Japanese Ministry of Justice 2013; Tabuchi 2011). Such changes have brought the concomitant challenge of how to integrate multicultural employees into their work organizations. So the aforementioned question about the veracity of imagined Japanese and American communal traits has important consequences as Japan’s population becomes more diverse and its corporations grow increasingly global: namely, by assessing such veracity, the current state of mutual acculturation outcomes between Japanese and American coworkers can be clarified, problematic acculturation dynamics identified, and better intercultural relations potentially facilitated.
According to Lueck and Wilson (2010), acculturation refers to “cultural changes resulting from primary contact between distinct ethnic groups” (p. 47), and it can involve psychological acculturation, or shifts in individual behaviors, attitudes, values, and identities (Berry et al. 1988; Smith Castro 2003). One way to test the accuracy of the aforementioned perceptions about imagined communities is to compare the quality of intercultural relations reported by Japanese and Americans in Japan to assess whether one group clearly has superior results—i.e., which group has more “successful” psychological acculturation outcomes at work. Therefore, the goals of this paper are to ascertain whether such differences exist—and if so, why.
Ideally, in order to compare American and Japanese proclivity in developing positive intercultural work relationships, a sample should include both Americans and Japanese working in Japan, as well as in the U.S.—where positions of sojourner and host are reversed. However, the focus in this study is consciously placed upon Japanese and Americans in Japan in order to test assumptions in the literature that Americans enjoy more successful outcomes of the psychological acculturation process—namely because this literature typically examines American-Japanese interactions in Japan. Therefore, this paper will test the robustness of such findings by taking a similar approach to the sources that produced them—i.e., sampling Americans and Japanese in Japan and confirming whether or not the literature’s conclusions about American and Japanese relational outcomes are supported.
It is also important to note that the acculturation of sojourners and long-term non-native residents to the host culture has inherent differences from the reciprocal process. While most acculturation scholars agree that acculturation is bidirectional (Sam 2006), the dominant group influences the acculturation-related attitudes and behaviors of non-dominant ethnocultural groups—exerting pressure to conform to their expectations for acculturation via interpersonal contact and social institutions (Berry 2006). Moreover, members of the host culture usually have broader choices as to whether and how they acculturate. In this study, it is understood that Americans (as an ethnoculturally non-dominant group in Japan) and Japanese people may experience the aforementioned differences in their mutual acculturation dynamics, so care is taken to select measures of acculturation outcomes for comparison which are relevant to both groups.
Theoretical framework and hypotheses
Nihonjinron: Its definition, inherent assumptions, and criticisms
Nihonjinron is a genre of both academic and popular literature which attempts to define the identity of Japanese people, their cultural traits, and to establish the uniqueness of Japanese people, culture, and society (Sullivan and Schatz 2009). Such goals are often furthered through comparisons with other countries—most commonly the United States (Befu 2001). For example, while Japanese are usually portrayed as group-oriented and mutually interdependent, Americans are independent individualists. While Japanese ascribe to a hierarchical society, Americans prefer egalitarianism (Befu 2001; Dale 1986).
Nihonjinron also comprises an ideology or world view in which Japanese culture and identity are described with a set of qualities that distinguish Japanese from other national and ethnic groups—tracing those characteristics most commonly to geography, topography, rural community structure, or language (Befu 2001; Goodman 2008; Murphy-Shigematsu 2008). Central to Nihonjinron is the belief that land, race, language, and culture in Japan are coterminous; as Befu (2001) explained, Japanese people “inherited Japanese ‘blood’ from their forebears, . . . [and] have always lived on the Japanese archipelago” while “no other person speaks the language natively and practices [Japanese] culture” (p. 71). A variety of symbols are employed to evoke feelings of unity between Japanese and delineate ingroup boundaries, including Japanese ancestry, citizenship, linguistic fluency (Kidder 1992), literacy, and joushiki (“common sense”) in matters of daily comportment and judgment (which is developed during one’s primary socialization in Japanese society). Of course, there are Japanese who do not ascribe to Nihonjinron, but this ideology is widespread—promulgated in part by the Nihonjinron literature.
Nihonjinron engenders an exclusive national identity in that Japanese are depicted as a culturally homogenous, unique group whose features cannot be understood by non-Japanese (Befu 2001; Dale 1986; McVeigh 2004; Sakata 2009). As McVeigh (2004) inveighed, “Only Japanese can (or should) possess things Japanese” (p. 187). Americans are presumed unable to understand Japanese culture, become fluent or literate in the language, or practice a mainstream Japanese lifestyle (Cook 2006; Greer 2001). Views of Japanese culture and ethnicity embodied in Nihonjinron have been criticized by Western sociologists of Japan as “primordialist” (Goodman 2008), or as McVeigh (2004) warned, these “culturalist explanations and myths of uniqueness . . . [bolster] ethnic exclusivism, heightened ethnocultural self-consciousness, [and] racialized notions of identity” (p. 196). Consequently, some Western scholars have promulgated images of Japanese as insular, lagging behind in acceptance of diversity, and less adept at forming positive intercultural relations (Pacific Institute 1993). Dale (1986) argued that Nihonjinron conceptualizes Japan in terms of “feudal categories which social development in the West outgrew and transcended” (p. 44). More recently, McVeigh (2004) asserted, “Japan still seems behind the times” (p. 282) in terms of its rejection of cultural diversity within its borders and how its national identity is conceptualized around discourses embracing racialized exclusivity.
Cultural sources of Japanese weakness in intercultural communication: Arguments for and against
If Japanese do experience more negative acculturation outcomes than Americans, what might be their sources? According to McVeigh (2006), Japanese attribute their supposed difficulties in building positive intercultural relations to their culture’s uniqueness and incomprehensibility to outsiders—a conundrum frequently traced to the Japanese language; McVeigh (2004) asserted:
Many Japanese assume that their own language, being unique and exceptionally difficult, is beyond the capabilities of non-Japanese to learn. Consequently, they then assume that they themselves, being on the other side of an impenetrable linguistic wall, cannot learn a foreign language. (pp 244-245)
Likewise, Rivers (2011) reviewed ample literature positing that numerous Japanese view English proficiency as a threat to their Japanese identity; as a result, it is not uncommon to resist learning English and reject the possibilities it opens for communicating with the outside world.
But are Japanese people really uninterested in English language studies—and by extension, intercultural communication? Sakuragi (2008) contended, “Language education appears to occupy a far more important position in Japan than in the United States” (p. 82). Virtually all Japanese students study a foreign language, usually English, through six years of secondary education, and English ability is widely perceived as a key to scholastic achievement, college entrance, and career advancement. Moreover, many universities have programs in international/intercultural communication by popular demand. Therefore, as Sakuragi concluded, one could also argue that Japanese are actually more interested in other cultures than Americans.
Other cultural differences which purportedly hinder Japanese acculturation outcomes can be rooted, ironically, in concepts central to the field of intercultural relations. For instance, Nakane (1970, 1972) declared that Japanese struggle when communicating with non-Japanese because of “localism,” or the tendency for Japanese within the same collective to build a common nexus of insider knowledge and styles of expression which is not understood by outgroup members—even other Japanese. Such ingroup peculiarities, coupled with bonds so strong that they preclude developing relations with non-Japanese, impede effective intercultural communication and render Japanese society and culture difficult for foreigners to understand.
Similarly, Befu (2001) observed that the understanding of Japanese verbal and nonverbal messages, of which non-Japanese are widely presumed to be incapable, is enabled by a “body of unstated and implicit assumptions” (p. 39) that serves as the “context” in which such messages are to be deciphered. Making effective communication more difficult with Americans is the Japanese people’s sensitivity to their status relative to their speaking partner (which leads them to adjust their predicate endings and vocabulary choices accordingly) as well as Japanese conflict aversion—namely because Americans make comparatively few linguistic adjustments according to status and prefer forthright communication (Befu 2001; Nakane 1972).
Although Nihonjinron proponents do not usually employ the terms high/low context, individualism/collectivism, or large/small power distance, Japanese are characterized in this literature as being high context, large in power distance, and collectivist—resulting in a communication style that low context, small power distance, and individualist Americans cannot comprehend—much less employ themselves. Moreover, Japanese struggle to transcend the effects of being socialized in this communication style and its concomitant values, which distinguish yet isolate them—thus impeding positive relationships with non-Japanese. So Nihonjinron literature is quick to emphasize American-Japanese cultural differences and employ them to construct, legitimate, and reinforce ideas of Japanese uniqueness and the impenetrable intercultural communication barriers which invariably accompany it. Scholarship in the field of intercultural relations begins from the same point—i.e., acknowledging cross-cultural difference—yet it also stands on the assumption that tribulations in intercultural communication, including those between Japanese and Americans, can be ameliorated by cognitively grasping, affectively accepting, and behaviorally adjusting to the outgroup cultural differences which are at their base (Barnlund 1989; Gudykunst and Nishida 1994). In this view, which is also at the heart of culture learning theory (Masgoret and Ward 2006), cultural difference does not inherently cause communication problems—more important is whether we perceive it as an impenetrable barrier (which justifies rigid in- and outgroup distinctions) or attempt to acculturate and seek intercultural understanding.
In summary, though its conclusions have been contended, an ample body of literature written by both Americans and Japanese argues that Japanese are less proficient at building positive intercultural relations than Americans. Proponents of this view disagree as to whether such deficiencies among Japanese stem from ethnocentrism, a simple lack of exposure to diverse peoples, or a sense of cultural uniqueness which spawns an unbridgeable communication gap. Regardless, the clash between this view that Japanese are less capable intercultural communicators and its rebuttals from the intercultural relations field and anthropology beg this question to be empirically tested.
Choosing and operationalizing the variables
Independent variables
Subjects were categorized according to nationality: Japanese and Americans.
Dependent variables
Five dependent variables were chosen to operationalize the broader concept of quality of intercultural relations in the workplace based on the assumption that such quality includes both that of one’s relationships with cultural outgroup members and that of the work produced in intercultural work environments—namely because such work is a tangible product of intercultural interactions (Black 1988; Kealey 1989, 1996; Ward 1996). Moreover, these measures were deemed to be relevant relational outcomes for both Japanese and Americans—i.e., the ethnoculturally dominant and non-dominant groups—so long as they are engaged in regular intergroup contact in the workplace (which, as detailed in the section “Sample and survey characteristics,” was one of the requirements for participation in the study).
Outgroup attitude and ingroup bias were included as dependent variables since they have been emphasized as important acculturation outcomes in a variety of studies (Barrette et al. 2004; Bourhis et al. 1997; Montreuil and Bourhis 2001; Zagefka and Brown 2002). Outgroup attitude reflects how one rates cultural outgroup members on various work-related qualities, such as being hard-working or competent. Ingroup bias measures the difference between one’s ratings of cultural outgroup members and those of the same work-related qualities among cultural ingroup members, thus showing one’s predilection towards people with the same national background.
Acceptance among one’s cultural outgroup coworkers has far-reaching benefits for expatriates; for instance, it can positively impact job performance, as one can more readily gain assistance from others (Aycan 1997b). Moreover, acceptance usually comes with sustained host culture involvement, which has been shown to reduce sojourner stress and promote positive affect towards the host culture (Berry et al. 1987; Inoue and Ito 1993; Komisarof 2004; Sanchez and Fernandez 1993; Ward 1996). In organizational contexts, people feel accepted as insiders when they have opportunities to lead, be promoted, gain access to confidential insider knowledge, and participate in group decision-making (Harris 1995; Komisarof 2001; Lois 1999). Considering these indicators, Jones’ (1986) measure of organizational investiture was utilized to operationalize the degree of acceptance and support felt in intercultural work relationships.
The degree and depth of social interaction with cultural outgroup members impacts sojourner adjustment to the host culture (Furnham and Bochner 1986; Mendenhall and Oddou 1985; Palthe 2004; Tucker et al. 2004). Specifically, such contact presents opportunities to learn culture-specific skills and ameliorate sociocultural adaptation problems (Ward 1996). Aycan (1997a) further observed that contact with host national colleagues can reduce workplace conflict, teach organizational norms, and increase both job performance and commitment for expatriates.
Quality of work results was operationalized as job effectiveness—i.e., the subjective evaluation of one’s job performance (Ones and Viswesvaran 1997). The definition and measurement of success at work may change depending upon the type of sojourner, her job roles, and the skills which those roles demand (Kealey 1996), so job effectiveness was deemed an appropriate measure of work results since it is adaptable to the broad variety of sojourner types, job statuses, corporate divisions, companies, and industries included in this study.
Potential confounding variables
In order to assess how much variance in each dependent measure was accounted for by nationality and how much was actually shared with other sources, eighteen variables were tested as confounding variables.
One potential confounding variable, acculturation strategies (Berry 2008; Berry et al. 2006), was proposed by Berry (1997a) to encompass both acculturation attitudes and their related behaviors. Such strategies are comprised of two independent, fundamental aspects which can be considered simultaneously: heritage cultural maintenance and intercultural contact (Berry and Sabatier 2010)—operationalized in this study as the extent that acculturating individuals strive to maintain their cultural attributes, as well as their degree of acculturation to their cultural outgroup (as depicted in Figure 1).
Individuals from either the dominant or nondominant ethnocultural group who embrace their own heritage cultural maintenance, but who oppose or do not see the importance of outgroup acculturation, adopt Separation strategies, while those who espouse acculturation to their outgroup, but reject or are unconcerned with their own cultural maintenance, choose Assimilation. Those who prefer both cultural maintenance and outgroup acculturation favor Integration, and those who desire neither are characterized by Marginalization. Acculturation strategies were tested as potential confounding variables because they relate specifically to people’s willingness to adapt to another ethnocultural group’s attitudes, values, and behaviors—thus impacting their daily intercultural communication dynamics and quality of intercultural relations.
Bourhis and colleagues’ Interactive Acculturation Model (IAM) (Barrette et al., 2004; Bourhis and Dayan 2004; Bourhis et al. 1997; Montreuil and Bourhis 2001) was utilized to assess the degree of acculturation strategy compatibility between Japanese and American coworkers—another potential confounding variable. Based upon Berry’s acculturation strategy framework, different combinations of acculturation strategies between host society members and immigrants or long-term sojourners result in three types of alignments: Consensual (i.e., the most positive), Problematic, and Conflictual (the most negative). Each alignment yields distinct clusters of social-psychological acculturation outcomes in general societal contexts (Bourhis and Dayan; Bourhis et al.) or within work organizations (Bourhis and Barrette: Mergers and the vitality of organizations, submitted). Due to limitations of the scales used in the current study (i.e., their inability to identify the acculturation strategy of Individualism proposed in the IAM), a modified form of the IAM was utilized with the same four acculturation strategies as in Berry’s model, or 16 potential acculturation strategy combinations. For these 16 combinations, the IAM’s original outcomes of Consensual, Problematic, and Conflictual alignments were maintained as illustrated in Figure 2.
Another two measures included as potential confounding variables were foreign language ability and social desirability bias. Foreign language ability has been broadly noted in the literature as promoting successful acculturation outcomes (Kealey 1996), and measurements of social desirability bias identified subjects who were potential sources of unreliable data.
Many demographic variables were identified in previous research which could influence associations between the independent and dependent variables in this study and thus were tested as potential confounding variables: gender (Sinangil and Ones 2003); length of time on job assignment (Robie and Ryan 1996); years lived abroad (Aycan 1997a); previous intercultural work experience (Aycan 1997a); as well as marital status, intermarriage with cultural outgroup members, and demographic composition of neighborhood of residence (i.e., inhabited primarily by host culture members or other ethnocultural groups) (Kim 2001). The following demographic variables were also thought by the author to be potential confounding variables: company size, industry, location of corporate headquarters (i.e., Japan or America), ethnocultural minority status in one’s organization, whether or not one’s nationality matched that of corporate headquarters, native language, age, and highest level of education completed.
The hypotheses
Five hypotheses were tested to assess the relationship between national groups and acculturation outcomes—i.e., whether there were statistically significant differences between Japanese and Americans on the five dependent measures. In order to test the assumption that Americans are more adept at building positive intercultural relationships than Japanese, it was posited that Americans would have better acculturation outcomes, i.e., higher scores on all of the dependent variables except ingroup bias, which is a negative outcome. While all of the dependent measures related to quality of intercultural relations, each one was treated separately both theoretically and empirically in order to ascertain more precisely if and how Japanese and American acculturation outcomes differed. The hypotheses were:
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H1. Americans will be associated with more positive outgroup attitudes towards Japanese than Japanese will towards Americans.
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H2. Japanese will be associated with stronger ingroup bias than Americans.
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H3. Americans will be associated with a deeper degree of organizational investiture than Japanese.
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H4. Americans will be associated with greater social interaction with cultural outgroup coworkers than Japanese.
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H5. Americans will be associated with higher job effectiveness than Japanese.